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Abstract In this paper, we give the mutually unbiased bases on the p2-
dimensional quantum system where p is an odd prime number, and construct
the corresponding unitary transformation based on the properties of these mu-
tually unbiased bases. Then, we construct a (N,N) threshold secret sharing
scheme using unitary transformation between these mutually unbiased bases,
and analyze the scheme’s security by several ways, for example, intercept-and-
resend attack, entangle-and-measure attack, Trojan horse attack, and so on.
Using our method, we construct a single-particle quantum protocol involv-
ing only one qudit, and the method shows much more scalability than other
schemes.
Keywords Quantum secret sharing · Mutually unbiased bases · Unitary
matrix
1 Introduction
Secret sharing is an important issue in modern cryptography. It’s idea is to
divide the secret into several sub-secrets so that the distributor can send the
sub-secrets to the participants through the channel, and only participants in
authorized subgroup work together can recover the secret, at the same time,
non-authorized participants can not get it. The secret sharing schemes can be
realized in different ways: the secret sharing schemes based on mathematics
is called the classical secret sharing schemes, and the security is ensured by
means of mathematical problems; the secret sharing schemes based on quan-
tum physics is called the quantum secret sharing schemes, and the security is
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guaranteed with the help of quantum physics law. Hillery et al. [1] proposed
the concept of quantum secret sharing with reference to the classical secret
sharing schemes, and designed a quantum secret sharing scheme by using the
quantum correlation of the GHZ states in 1998. The basic idea of this scheme
is to share an unknown quantum state among the two participants. In order
to restore the secret, the two parties must cooperate to obtain it. Since then,
quantum secret sharing has attracted people’s interest, a series of quantum
secret sharing schemes have been proposed [2-11].
Mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) is an important tool in many quantum
information processing. There have been some results on MUBs [12-18]. In
[12], it is proved that the maximum number of MUBs in d-dimensional com-
plex space Cd does not exceed d+1, and [13] shows that the maximum number
of MUBs is d+1 when the dimension d of this space is a power of a prime. In
[19], Tavakoli et al. used the cyclicity of MUBs and the theory of unitary ma-
trix to give a secret sharing scheme on p-dimensional quantum system where p
is an odd prime. In this paper, we discuss the case of p2-dimensional quantum
system with p being an odd prime. First we study the related properties of
MUBs on Cp
2
, and then construct the unitary matrix based on these prop-
erties. Finally, we construct a secret sharing scheme on the p2-dimensional
quantum system and discuss the security of the scheme.
2 MUBs and their related properties
We define two bases B0 = {ψ01 , ψ02 , · · · , ψ0d} and B1 = {ψ11, ψ12 , · · · , ψ1d} over
a d-dimensional complex space to be mutually unbiased if the inner products
between all possible vector pairs all have the same magnitude:
|〈ψ0l |ψ1j 〉| =
1√
d
(1)
where l, j = 1, 2, · · · , d.
Definition 1 A set of orthonormal bases B = {B0, B1, · · · , Bm} is said
to be a set of MUBs if the elements of B are non-biased relative to each other.
Wootters et al. [13] Pointed out that the maximum number of MUBs in
d-dimensional complex space is d+ 1 when the dimension d of this space is a
power of a prime. We suppose that d = pn, and p is an prime. When p 6= 2,
the specific form of these MUBs is given by using the theory of finite fields.
Let Fpn be a finite field, where p is an odd prime, and n is a natural number.
We order
|v(j)l 〉 =
1√
d
∑
k∈Fpn
ωTr(jk
2+lk)|k〉, j, l ∈ Fpn , ω = e
2pii
p (2)
where |v(j)l 〉 ∈ Cd(d = pn), the superscript j of |v(j)l 〉 represents the jth group
base, and the subscript l of |v(j)l 〉 does the lth vector in the base. When j ∈ Fpn ,
The bases given by Eq.(2) are denoted in turn V0, V1, · · · , Vm, · · · :
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When j = 0, V0 = {|v(0)0 〉, |v(0)1 〉, · · · , |v(0)l 〉, · · · |l ∈ Fpn};
When j = 1, V1 = {|v(1)0 〉, |v(1)1 〉, · · · , |v(1)l 〉, · · · |l ∈ Fpn};
· · ·
When j = m,m ∈ Fpn , Vm = {|v(m)0 〉, |v(m)1 〉, · · · , |v(m)l 〉, · · · |l ∈ Fpn};
· · ·
When j = d, we order
|v(d)l 〉 =
∑
k∈Fpn
δlk|k〉, l ∈ Fpn . (3)
We call this group of bases defined by Eq.(3) is a computing base, and the
corresponding base is recorded as Vd = {|0〉, |1〉, · · · , |l〉, · · · |l ∈ Fpn}.
Let M = {Vm|m = 0, 1, · · · , d,m ∈ Fpn}. By Definition 1, we can know
thatM which is consisted of V0, V1, · · · , Vd is a set of MUBs, and the potential
of M is d+ 1. When n = 1, M is a set of MUBs over Fp, which is studied in
[16]. Next, we consider the situation of n = 2. We give the relevant properties
of the corresponding MUBs over Fp2 , which is defined by the Eq.(2).
Since Fp2 is the quadratic extension of Fp, let f(x) be a quadratic irre-
ducible polynomial over Fp, and θ is a root of f(x), then Fp2 = Fp(θ) =
{k1 + k2θ|k1, k2 ∈ Fp}. Assume g : Fp2 → Zp2 is a mapping from the finite
field Fp2 to the residual class ring Zp2 , then define
g(k1 + k2θ) = k1 + k2 · p(modp2), k1 + k2θ ∈ Fp2 .
It is easy to verify that g is a one-to-one mapping, and has the following
properties.
Lemma 1 Let Fp2 be a finite field. The superscript and the subscript of
the MUBs defined by Eq.(2) have the following properties:
1) The subscript l + 1 of |v(j)l+1〉 satisfies l + 1 = g−1(g(l) + 1)(modp);
2) The superscript j + 1 of |v(j+1)l 〉 satisfies j + 1 = g−1(g(j) + 1)(modp).
Example 1 when l = 2θ + p − 1, j ∈ Fp2 , where p is a prime number
and p > 3, then we have
l+ 1 = g−1(g(l) + 1)(modp)
= g−1(g(2θ + p− 1) + 1)(modp)
= g−1((2 · p+ p− 1) + 1)(modp)
= g−1(3 · p)(modp)
= 3θ(modp)
= 3θ.
Hence, when l = 2θ + p− 1, |v(j)l+1〉 = |v(j)2θ 〉, j ∈ Fp2 .
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Further, let S = {A1, A2, B1, B2}, where
A1 = diag(ω
Tr(0), ωTr(1), · · · , ωTr(p−1), ωTr(θ), ωTr(θ+1), · · · , ωTr(θ+p−1),
· · · , ωTr((p−1)θ), ωTr((p−1)θ+1), · · · , ωTr((p−1)θ+p−1));
A2 = diag(ω
0a, ω1a, · · · , ω(p−1)a, ωb, ωb+a, · · · , ωb+(p−1)a, · · · , ω(p−1)b,
ω(p−1)b+a, · · · , ω(p−1)b+(p−1)a);
B1 = diag(ω
Tr(02), ωTr(1
2), · · · , ωTr((p−1)2), ωTr(θ2), ωTr((θ+1)2), · · · , ωTr((θ+p−1)2),
· · · , ωTr(((p−1)θ)2), ωTr(((p−1)θ+1)2), · · · , ωTr(((p−1)θ+p−1)2))
B2 = diag(ω
02a, ω1
2a, · · · , ω(p−1)2a, ωTr(cθ2), ωTr(c(θ+1)2), · · · , ωTr(c(θ+p−1)2),
· · · , ωTr(c((p−1)θ)2), ωTr(c((p−1)θ+1)2), · · · , ωTr(c((p−1)θ+p−1)2)).
It is obvious that the order of these four matrixes are all p. Here, ω = e
2pii
p , a =
Tr(θ)− Tr(p− 1), b = Tr(θ2)− Tr((p− 1)θ), c = θ − (p− 1).
Theorem 1 Let Fp2 be a finite field, the MUBs defined by the Eq.(2)
have the following properties:
1) When l ∈ {θ · d+ e|d ∈ Zp, e ∈ Zp−1}, A1|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j)l+1〉;
2) When l ∈ {θ · d+ (p− 1)|d ∈ Zp}, A2|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j)l+1〉;
3) When j ∈ {θ · d+ e|d ∈ Zp, e ∈ Zp−1}, B1|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j+1)l 〉;
4) When j ∈ {θ · d+ (p− 1)|d ∈ Zp}, B2|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j+1)l 〉.
Proof When l ∈ {θ · d+ e|d ∈ Zp, e ∈ Zp−1},
A1|v(j)l 〉
= A1
1√
d
∑
k∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+lk)|k〉
= 1√
d
[ωTr(j·0
2+l·0) ·ωTr(0)|0〉+ωTr(j·12+l·1) ·ωTr(1)|1〉+ · · ·+ωTr(j·(p−1)2+l·(p−1))
·ωTr(p−1)|p− 1〉+ ωTr(j·θ2+l·θ) · ωTr(θ)|θ〉+ · · ·+ ωTr(j·(θ+p−1)2+l·(θ+p−1))
·ωTr(θ+p−1)|θ+p−1〉+ · · ·+ωTr(j·((p−1)θ)2+l·((p−1)θ)) ·ωTr((p−1)θ)|(p−1)θ〉+ · · ·
+ωTr(j·((p−1)θ+p−1)
2+l·((p−1)θ+p−1)) · ωTr((p−1)θ+p−1)|(p− 1)θ + p− 1〉]
= 1√
d
[ωTr(j·0
2+(l+1)·0)|0〉+ ωTr(j·12+(l+1)·1)|1〉+ · · ·+ ωTr(j·(p−1)2+(l+1)·(p−1))
·|p− 1〉+ ωTr(j·θ2+(l+1)·θ)|θ〉+ · · ·+ ωTr(j·(θ+p−1)2+(l+1)·(θ+p−1))|θ + p− 1〉
+ · · ·+ ωTr(j·((p−1)θ)2+(l+1)·((p−1)θ))|(p− 1)θ〉+ · · ·
+ωTr(j·((p−1)θ+p−1)
2+(l+1)·((p−1)θ+p−1))|(p− 1)θ + p− 1〉]
= 1√
d
∑
k∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+(l+1)k)|k〉
= |v(j)l+1〉.
Therefore, when l ∈ {θ · d + e|d ∈ Zp, e ∈ Zp−1}, A1|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j)l+1〉. The
following 2) 3) and 4) can be proved by the same way:
2) When l ∈ {θ · d+ (p− 1)|d ∈ Zp}, A2|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j)l+1〉;
3) When j ∈ {θ · d+ e|d ∈ Zp, e ∈ Zp−1}, B1|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j+1)l 〉;
4) When j ∈ {θ · d+ (p− 1)|d ∈ Zp}, B2|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j+1)l 〉.
Remark 1 The cyclicity of MUBs can be obtained by Theorem 1, as
shown in Fig.1 and Fig.2:
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Fig. 1 cyclicity of the subscript of MUBs.
Fig. 2 cyclicity of the superscript of MUBs.
3 The construction of the unitary matrix
In this section, we construct the unitary matrix over Fp2 such that for any
α, β ∈ Fp2 , any vector |v(j)l 〉 can be mapped into |v(j+β)l+α 〉. That is, elements
of M are mapped into elements of M . Note that, any vector |v(j)l 〉 can be
transformed into |v(j+β)l+α 〉 by applying the transformation
Uα,β = A
y1
2 A
(p−1)y1+x1
1 B
y2
2 B
(p−1)y2+x2
1 , (4)
where α = x1+y1θ, β = x2+y2θ, x1, x2, y1, y2,∈ Fp, and the addition of l+α,
j + β in |v(j+β)l+α 〉 is addition over Zp. The Eq.(4) can be proved as follows:
Since Am, Bm,m = 1, 2, are unitary matrixes, and it is easy to be proved that
Uα,β is a unitary matrix. Next we prove that Uα,β|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j+β)l+α 〉 is held.
Assume that l = k1 + k2θ, j = k3 + k4θ, where km ∈ Fp,m = 1, 2, 3, 4, and
α = x1 + y1θ, β = x2 + y2θ.
Hence, l + α = (k1 + x1) + (k2 + y1)θ, j + β = (k3 + x2) + (k4 + y2)θ.
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By Theorem 1, |v(j)l 〉 = Ak22 A(p−1)k2+k11 Bk42 B(p−1)k4+k31 |v(0)0 〉, then we have
Uα,β|v(j)l 〉
= Ay12 A
(p−1)y1+x1
1 B
y2
2 B
(p−1)y2+x2
1 · (Ak22 A(p−1)k2+k11 Bk42 B(p−1)k4+k31 |v(0)0 〉)
= Ay12 A
(p−1)y1+x1
1 B
y2
2 B
(p−1)y2+x2
1 A
k2
2 A
(p−1)k2+k1
1 B
k4
2 B
(p−1)k4+k3
1 |v(0)0 〉
= Ay1+k22 A
(p−1)(y1+k2)+(x1+k1)
1 B
y2+k4
2 B
(p−1)(y2+k4)+(x2+k3)
1 |v(0)0 〉
= |v(j+β)l+α 〉.
Hence, Uα,β|v(j)l 〉 = |v(j+β)l+α 〉.
4 (N,N)threshold scheme
In this section, we construct a (N,N) threshold secret sharing scheme over Fp2 .
Here Alice is a distributor, and Bob1,Bob2, · · · ,BobN are the participants.
4.1 Preparation phase
(1)Alice prepares quantum state |v(0)0 〉, where |v(0)0 〉 = 1√p2
∑
k∈F
p2
|k〉;
(2)Alice randomly selects independent α0, β0 ∈ Fp2 , and lets α0 = x01 +
y01θ, β0 = x02 + y02θ, where x01, y01, x02, y02 ∈ Fp. By Eq.(4), Uα0,β0 =
A
y01
2 A
(p−1)y01+x01
1 B
y02
2 B
(p−1)y02+x02
1 , Alice performs on |v(0)0 〉 the transforma-
tion Uα0,β0 . Her action gives a state |ψ0〉 which is sent to Bob1;
(3)Alice randomly selects independent β1, β2, · · · , βN ∈ Fp2 , and sends βk
to Bobk, where βk = xk2 + yk2θ, xk2, yk2 ∈ Fp for k = 1, 2, · · · , N .
4.2 Distribution phase
(1)Bob1 randomly chooses α1 ∈ Fp2 , and lets α1 = x11 + y11θ, where
x11, y11 ∈ Fp, and β1 = x12 + y12θ received from Alice. By Eq.(4), Uα1,β1 =
A
y11
2 A
(p−1)y11+x11
1 B
y12
2 B
(p−1)y12+x12
1 , Bob1 applies Uα1,β1 to the qudit |ψ0〉 re-
ceived from Alice. Bob1’s action gives a state |ψ1〉, which is sent Bob2;
(2)Bob2 randomly chooses α2 ∈ Fp2 , and lets α2 = x21 + y21θ, where
x21, y21 ∈ Fp, and β2 = x22 + y22θ received from Alice. By Eq.(4), Uα2,β2 =
A
y21
2 A
(p−1)y21+x21
1 B
y22
2 B
(p−1)y22+x22
1 , Bob2 applies Uα2,β2 to the qudit |ψ1〉 re-
ceived from Bob1. Bob2’s action gives a state |ψ2〉, which is sent Bob3;
(3)Repeat this process until BobN receives the state |ψN−1〉 from BobN−1.
BobN randomly selects αN ∈ Fp2 , and lets αN = xN1 + yN1θ, where xN1,
yN1 ∈ Fp, and βN = xN2 + yN2θ received from Alice. By Eq.(4), UαN ,βN =
A
yN1
2 A
(p−1)yN1+xN1
1 B
yN2
2 B
(p−1)yN2+xN2
1 , BobN applies UαN ,βN to the qudit
|ψN−1〉. BobN ’s action gives a state |ψN 〉, which is sent Alice.
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4.3 Measurement phase
Alice calculates the
∑N
k=0 βk(modp) privately, and records the results as J ,
and uses the base |v(J)l 〉 to measure the quantum state |ψN 〉. If the result is
|v(J)h 〉, then Alice marks h, h ∈ Fp2 .
4.4 Testing phase
In order to check the security, Alice orders Bobk announce their choice of αk
for k = 1, 2, · · · , N , and calculates whether the following formula holds:
N∑
k=0
αk = h(modp). (5)
If the Eq.(5) holds, this run is safe, and the protocol continues; otherwise, it
is unsafe, and there is eavesdropping or deceit. Then we discard this run.
4.5 Recovery phase
If this run is safe, parties Bob1,Bob2, · · · ,BobN , after changing all their data
αk for a valid run, not used in the security check, can reconstruct the key s
for the given run:
s =
N∑
k=1
αk(modp).
Remark 2 The reason why the protocol can run is that:
|ψN 〉 = UαN ,βN · UαN−1,βN−1 · · · · ·Uα0,β0 |v(0)0 〉 = |v(Γ )∆ 〉.
where ∆ =
∑N
k=0 αk(modp
2), Γ =
∑N
k=0 βk(modp
2).
5 Security analysis
The secret sharing scheme must ensure security. In this section, we discuss the
security of the scheme in the following two aspects.
5.1 External attack
5.1.1 Intercept-and-resend attack
If there is an external eavesdropper Eve, she tries to take an intercept-and-
resend attack and intercept a quantum state |v(j)l 〉 sent from Bobk to Bobk+1.
She selects one of d relevant bases to measure, where d = p2. Eve attacks
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successfully with a probability of 1
d
, However, with a probability of d−1
d
she
fails. When the attack fails, the quantum state that Eve resends to Bobk+1
will be changed and the eavesdropping will be found. Therefore, the success of
eavesdropping depends largely on d, and inconsistency will be caused between
the private data and Eq.(5), so the protocol testing state can be checked out.
5.1.2 More general eavesdropping attacks
For the more general eavesdropping attacks, in the qudit transfer from Bobk
to Bobk+1, we can treat the parties Bob1, · · · ,Bobk as a ”block” effectively
representing a single community, and parties Bobk+1, · · · ,BobN+1 and Bob1,
acting as a measurement community, so the eavesdropping attack is simplified
to the case of previously encountered in the BB84 two-party QKD, we can
treat it in a similar way.
5.1.3 Entangle-and-measure attack
If there is an external eavesdropper Eve, she tries to take an entangle-and-
measure attack and uses a unitary operation UE to entangle an ancillary
particle on the transmitted particle, then she measures the ancillary parti-
cle to steal secret information. Assume that the ancillary particle is |E〉. Eve
performs the unitary transform UE on her particles and |E〉 in the following
forms,
UE |k〉|E〉 =
∑
l∈F
p2
akl|l〉|ekl〉. (6)
UE |v(j)l 〉|E〉 = UE(
1√
p2
∑
k∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+lk)|k〉)|E〉
=
1√
p2
∑
k∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+lk)UE |k〉|E〉
=
1√
p2
∑
k∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+lk)(
∑
l∈F
p2
akl|l〉|ekl〉)
=
1√
p2
∑
k∈F
p2
∑
l∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+lk)akl(
1√
p2
∑
m∈F
p2
ω−Tr(jl
2+ml)|v(j)m 〉)|ekl〉
=
1
p2
∑
k∈Fp2
∑
l∈Fp2
∑
m∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+lk)−Tr(jl2+ml)akl|v(j)m 〉|ekl〉.
that is to say,
UE |v(j)l 〉|E〉 =
1
p2
∑
k∈F
p2
∑
l∈F
p2
∑
m∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+lk)−Tr(jl2+ml)akl|v(j)m 〉|ekl〉. (7)
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where |v(j)l 〉 = 1√p2
∑
k∈F
p2
ωTr(jk
2+lk)|k〉, ω = e 2piip , k, l, j,m ∈ Fp2 , |ekl〉 is the
pure auxiliary state determined uniquely by the unitary transform UE , and
∑
l∈F
p2
|akl|2 = 1(k ∈ Fp2). (8)
In order to avoid wiretapping detection, Eve has to set: akl = 0, where
k 6= l and k, l ∈ Fp2 . Therefore, the Eq.(6) and Eq.(7) can be simplified as
follows:
UE |k〉|E〉 = ak|k〉|ek〉. (9)
UE |v(j)l 〉|E〉 =
1
p2
∑
k∈F
p2
∑
m∈F
p2
ωTr((l−m)k)ak|v(j)m 〉|ek〉. (10)
where ak = akk, ek = ekk.
Similarly, Eve can obtain that
∑
k∈F
p2
ωTr((l−m)k)ak|ek〉 = 0, where m 6= l,
and m ∈ Fp2 . Then for any l ∈ Fp2 , we can get p2− 1 equations. According to
these p2 − 1 equations, we can compute that
a0|e0〉 = a1|e1〉 = · · · = am|em〉 = · · · = a(p−1)θ+p−1|e(p−1)θ+p−1〉,m ∈ Fp2 .
To obtain useful information about the secret, without loss of generality,
Eve uses the unitary transform UE on the |v(0)0 〉 = 1√
p2
(|0〉+ |1〉+ · · ·+ |(p−
1)θ + p− 1〉), that is to say,
UE|v(0)0 〉
= 1√
p2
(a0|0〉|e0〉+ a1|1〉|e1〉+ · · ·+ a(p−1)θ+p−1|(p− 1)θ+ p− 1〉|e(p−1)θ+p−1〉)
= 1√
p2
(|0〉+ |1〉+ · · ·+ |(p− 1)θ + p− 1〉)⊗ (a0|e0〉).
It is easy to see from the above equation that if Eve wants to avoid eaves-
dropping detection, she can not affect the whole system of quantum secret
sharing, and can not get effective information from the auxiliary particle.
Therefore, the entanglement measurement attack is invalid.
5.1.4 Trojan horse attack
In this section, we will primarily consider another important attack-Trojan
horse attack. If the particles used in the QSS scheme are photons, the pro-
posed protocol may be unsafe for the following two Trojan horse attacks: the
delay photon attack and the invisible photon attack. In order to prevent the de-
lay photon attack, the participants must be able to distinguish whether there
are multi-photon signals. That is to say, it must be able to distinguish the
received photons from single-photon and multi-photon. PNS technology can
meet this requirement. The participants can pick up a portion of the photons
and split each particle by the PNS technology, then they measure the photons.
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If the multi-photon rate is much higher than the desired value, the transfer
process should be stopped and restarted. To prevent the invisible photon at-
tacks, the participants need to add filters to the device. The filter only allows
photons whose wavelength of the photon signal is close to the wavelength of
the operating particle to enter. Therefore, the attacker’s invisible photons will
be isolated.
5.2 Internal attack
In a quantum secret sharing scheme, it is very important to defend against
the participant’s conspiracy attack because it is more simple and effective
than other external attacks. In fact, participant conspiratorial attacks have
destroyed many quantum secret sharing schemes. Here, we will discuss the
security of our scheme against some particular conspiracies. However, rigorous
security proof for general conspiracies is unknown.
5.2.1 Only one dishonest participant
In this section, we suppose that there is only one dishonest participant Bobj
for j ∈ 1, 2, · · · , N who receives |ψj−1〉 from Bobj−1 when j > 1 or Alice
when j = 1, then Bobj applies Uαj ,βj to the qudit |ψj−1〉, and passes it to the
next participant. In the testing phase, when Bobj publishes the data αj , two
operations can be performed: (a) Bobj announces the wrong αj , which can be
directly judged by Eq.(5) that this run of protocol is unsafe and we discard
this run; (b) Bobj announces the correct αj . In this case, Eq.(5) holds, and
then this run will not be detected the exist of the dishonest participant, and
the protocol continues to be implemented. Then, dishonest Bobj can correctly
guess the value of
∑N
n=1 αn−αj with probability 1d , where d = p2, and then get
the key
∑N
n=1 αn. But with probability
d−1
d
he guesses wrong in which case
the key can not be obtained accurately, and the eavesdropping fails. When
applying the scheme, we always carry out multiple rounds for n rounds of the
above agreement, not only one round, and then the probability of successful
eavesdropping ( 1
d
)n will tend to zero, that is to say, the protocol is safe.
5.2.2 k dishonest participants
Assuming that there are k dishonest participants αj1 , αj2 , · · · , αjk . Similar to
only one dishonest participant, consider the k individuals as a whole K where
αK = αj1+αj2+· · ·+αjk . In the testing phase, whenK publishes the data αK ,
two operations can be performed: (a) K announces the wrong αK , which can
be directly judged by Eq.(5) that this run of protocol is unsafe and we discard
this run; (b) K announces the correct αK . In this case, Eq.(5) holds, and then
this run will not be detected the exist of the dishonest participant, and the
protocol continues to be implemented. Then, dishonest K can correctly guess
the value of
∑N
n=1 αn − αK with probability 1d , where d = p2, and then get
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the key
∑N
n=1 αn. But with probability
d−1
d
he guesses wrong in which case
the key can not be obtained accurately, and the eavesdropping fails. When
applying the scheme, we always carry out multiple rounds for n rounds of the
above agreement, not only one round, and then the probability of successful
eavesdropping ( 1
d
)n will tend to zero, that is, the protocol is safe.
5.2.3 Using quantum memories and entangling of systems with an ancilla
In,e.g.,Refs.[20] eavesdropping attacks use quantum memories and entangling
of systems with an ancilla. However, the attacks of [20] require that either
the first or the final party are cheating, which never happens in our protocol
because Alice is effectively both first and last party. Additionally, the eaves-
dropping attacks of [20] require knowledge of also β0 and J , which is impossible
since Alice never announces any data.
To facilitate the understanding of the above scheme, we give an example
as follows:
Example 2 We consider the (3, 3) threshold secret sharing scheme for
p = 3, d = 32. That is, there are one distributor Alice and three participants
Bob1, Bob2,Bob3.
When p = 3, d = 32, we can get Uα,β = A
y1
2 A
2y1+x1
1 B
y2
2 B
2y2+x2
1 by Eq.(4)
where α, β ∈ F9. We suppose that f(x) = x2+x+2, then we can calculate that
a = Tr(θ)−Tr(p−1) = 1, b = Tr(θ2)−Tr((p−1)θ) = 2, c = θ−(p−1) = θ−2,
and
A1 = diag(1, ω
2, ω, ω2, ω, 1, ω, 1, ω2);
A2 = diag(1, ω, ω
2, ω2, 1, ω, ω, ω2, 1);
B1 = diag(1, ω
2, ω2, 1, 1, ω, 1, ω, 1);
B2 = diag(1, ω, ω, ω
2, ω, ω2, ω2, ω2, ω).
Preparation phase:
(1)Alice prepares the quantum state |v(0)0 〉:
|v(0)0 〉 =
1√
p2
∑
k∈F
p2
|k〉
=
1
3
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)′;
(2)Alice randomly selects independent α0, β0 ∈ F9. We assume that α0 =
1 + θ, β0 = θ. By Eq.(4), we can know that x01 = 1, y01 = 1, x02 = 0, y02 = 1,
and
Uα0,β0 = A
y01
2 A
2y01+x01
1 B
y02
2 B
2y02+x02
1
= A12A
2·1+1
1 B
1
2B
2·1+0
1
= A2B2B
2
1 .
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|ψ0〉 = Uα0,β0 |v(0)0 〉 = A2B2B21 |v(0)0 〉 = 13 (1, 1, ω, ω, ω, ω2, 1, 1, ω)′, and |ψ0〉 is
passed to Bob1;
(3)Alice randomly selects independent β1, β2, β3 ∈ F9, and sends βk to
Bobk for k = 1, 2, 3. We assume that β1 = 1, β2 = θ, β3 = 1 + θ.
Distribution phase:
(1)Bob1: Bob1 randomly selects α1 ∈ F9, and we assume that α1 = θ. At
the same time, β1 = 1. By Eq.(4), we can know that x11 = 0, y11 = 1, x12 =
1, y12 = 0 and
Uα1,β1 = A
y11
2 A
(p−1)y11+x11
1 B
y12
2 B
(p−1)y12+x12
1
= A12A
2·1+0
1 · B02B2·0+11
= A2A
2
1B1.
|ψ1〉 = Uα1,β1 |ψ0〉 = A2A21B1|ψ0〉 = 13 (1, ω, ω, ω, 1, ω, 1, 1, ω2)′, and |ψ1〉 is
passed to Bob2;
(2)Bob2: Bob2 randomly selects α2 ∈ F9, and we assume that α2 = θ. At
the same time, β2 = θ. By Eq.(4), we can know that x21 = 0, y21 = 1, x22 =
0, y22 = 1 and
Uα2,β2 = A
y21
2 A
(p−1)y21+x21
1 B
y22
2 B
(p−1)y22+x22
1
= A12A
2·1+0
1 · B12B2·1+01
= A2A
2
1B2B
2
2 .
|ψ2〉 = Uα2,β2 |ψ1〉 = A2A21B2B21 |ψ1〉 = 13 (1, ω2, ω, 1, 1, 1, ω2, 1, ω)′, and |ψ2〉 is
passed to Bob3;
(3)Bob3: Bob3 randomly selects α3 ∈ F9, and we assume that α3 = 2 + θ.
At the same time, β3 = 1 + θ. By Eq.(4), we can know that x31 = 2, y31 =
1, x32 = 1, y32 = 1 and
Uα3,β3 = A
y31
2 A
(p−1)y31+x31
1 B
y32
2 B
(p−1)y32+x32
1
= A12A
2·1+2
1 · B12B2·1+11
= A2A1B2.
|ψ3〉 = Uα3,β3 |ψ2〉 = A2A1B2|ψ2〉 = 13 (1, 1, ω2, 1, ω2, 1, 1, ω, ω)′, and |ψ3〉 is
passed to Alice.
Measurement phase:
Alice calculates the
∑3
k=0 βk(mod3) = θ+1+θ+(1+θ) = 2 privately, and
uses the base |v(2)l 〉 to measure the quantum state |ψ3〉. The result is |v(2)θ 〉,
then Alice marks θ, θ ∈ F9.
Testing phase:
In order to check the security, Alice lets the participants Bobk announce
their choice of αk for k = 1, 2, 3, and calculates the following formula:
3∑
k=0
αk = (1 + θ) + θ + θ + (2 + θ) = θ(mod3) = θ.
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Eq.(5) holds, this run is safe, and the protocol continues.
Recovery phase:
Bobk share their αk for k = 1, 2, 3, and they will get the key:
s =
3∑
k=1
αk(mod3) = θ + θ + (2 + θ)(mod3) = 2.
So, the key generated by this round is 2.
6 Conclusions
Using our method, we construct a single-particle quantum protocol involving
only one qudit. Although our protocol does not consider possible complex
attacks, it can resist standard attacks and show much more scalability than
other schemes. Compared to the [19], we extend the case where d is an odd
prime to the square of an odd prime. Of course, we guess that the result can
be generalized to any power of odd prime, but these cases are more complex.
This is the question that we will further study in the future.
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